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Abstract 24 
Niche construction is the modification of components in an environment through an 25 
organism’s activities. Humans modify their environments mainly through ontogenetic 26 
and cultural processes, and it is this reliance on learning, plasticity and culture that 27 
lends human niche construction a special potency. In this paper we aim to facilitate 28 
discussion between researchers interested in niche construction and those interested in 29 
human development by highlighting some of the related processes. We discuss the 30 
transmission of culturally relevant information, how the human mind is a symbol-31 
generating and artefact-devising system, and how these processes are bi-directional, 32 
with infants and children both being directed, and directing, their own development. 33 
We reflect on these in the light of four approaches: natural pedagogy, activity theory, 34 
distributed cognition and situated learning. Throughout, we highlight pertinent 35 
examples in non-humans that parallel or further explicate the processes discussed. 36 
Finally we offer three future directions; two involving the use of new techniques in 37 
the realms of neuroscience and modelling, and the third suggesting exploration of 38 
changes in the affects of niche construction across the lifespan. 39 
 40 
Keywords: niche construction, pedagogy, activity theory, distributed cognition, 41 
situated learning, cultural evolution   42 
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1. Niche Construction Theory 43 
Niche construction refers to the modification of both living and non-living 44 
components in environments through the metabolic, physiological and behavioural 45 
activities of organisms, as well as through their choices. For example, many species 46 
of animals manufacture nests, burrows, holes, webs, and pupal cases; algae and plants 47 
change levels of atmospheric redox states, and influence energy and matter flows by 48 
modifying nutrient cycles; fungi and bacteria decompose organic matter; bacteria also 49 
fix nutrients and excrete compounds that alter environments.  50 
 The niche-construction perspective in evolutionary biology explicitly 51 
recognizes environmental modification by organisms (‘niche construction’), and its 52 
legacy over time (henceforth ‘ecological inheritance’), to be evolutionary processes: 53 
that is, they cause evolutionary change by acting as sources of modified selection, as 54 
well as of modified phenotypes (Lewontin, 1983; Odling-Smee, Laland & Feldman, 55 
2003). This stance can be contrasted with the more tacit recognition of organisms’ 56 
environmental impacts in standard evolutionary accounts.  57 
 From the niche-construction perspective, environmental modification is 58 
regarded as an evolutionarily significant process, and not just a product of other 59 
recognized evolutionary processes; as a cause, rather than an effect. This extension 60 
has produced a body of conceptual and formal theory, known as ‘niche construction 61 
theory’ (henceforth ‘NCT’), which explores the ecological and evolutionary 62 
ramifications of niche construction (Boni & Feldman, 2005; Kendal, Tehrani & 63 
Odling-Smee, 2011; Kylafis & Loreau, 2008; Laland, Odling-Smee & Feldman, 1996, 64 
1999, 2010; Lehmann, 2008; Odling-Smee et al., 2003; Post & Palkovacs, 2009; 65 
Silver & DiPaolo, 2006). These insights from mathematical evolutionary theory 66 
provide unambiguous evidence that niche construction is likely to be of considerable 67 
4 
 
ecological and evolutionary importance, and suggest that NCT may have implications 68 
for adjacent disciplines. 69 
 Here we consider some of the ramifications of NCT for one such academic 70 
field – developmental psychology. The opportunities for a fruitful bi-directional 71 
transfer of knowledge between these two fields of enquiry are rich. This fertile 72 
exchange is underpinned by a long, and largely independent, tradition of 73 
‘constructivist’ thinking in developmental psychology that resonates with the 74 
arguments inherent in NCT. For instance, Daniel Lehrman (1953, 1970) stressed how 75 
the animal mind does not consist of pre-specified programmes, but is built via a 76 
constant interplay between the individual and its environment. Likewise, the 77 
developmental biologist Conrad Waddington (1959, p1636) anticipated many of the 78 
key aspects of NCT, writing that ‘the animal by its behaviour contributes in a most 79 
important way to the nature and intensity of the selective pressures which will be 80 
exerted on it’. For Lehrman and Waddington, like many other developmentally-81 
minded psychologists and biologists since (including Schneirla, Gottlieb, Bateson, 82 
Oyama, Gray, amongst others), individuals are construed to play an active role in 83 
shaping the conditions of their own development.  84 
 In the sections below we review this tradition and then attempt to draw out 85 
some commonalities between it and NCT, as well as opportunities for useful 86 
exchange and future directions. We begin by introducing NCT, describing how niche 87 
construction can both result from multiple processes, including developmental 88 
processes, and trigger feedback at a variety of levels, including at levels of analysis 89 
relevant to developmental psychologists. 90 
 91 
1.1 What is niche construction? 92 
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The conventional view of evolution is that, through the action of natural selection, 93 
species have come to exhibit those characteristics that best enable them to survive and 94 
reproduce in their environments. Organisms are generally perceived as being moulded 95 
by selection to become suited to their world (Figure 1a). The niche construction 96 
perspective in evolutionary biology contrasts with the conventional perspective by 97 
placing emphasis on the capacity of organisms to modify environmental states. In 98 
doing so, organisms co-direct their own evolution, often but not exclusively in a 99 
manner that suits their genotypes, in the process modifying patterns of selection 100 
acting back on themselves, as well as on other species that inhabit their environment 101 
(Figure 1b). Organisms and environments are treated by NCT as engaged in 102 
reciprocally caused relationships (Laland & Sterelny, 2006; Laland, Sterelny, Odling-103 
Smee, Hoppitt & Uller, 2011), that are negotiated over both ontogenetic and 104 
phylogenetic timescales, entwined in, to coin a very apt phrase from developmental 105 
systems theory, ‘cycles of contingency’ (Oyama, Griffiths & Gray, 2001).  106 
 In recent years this feedback from organisms’ activities has been subject to 107 
intense investigation through mathematical population-genetic analyses. It is now 108 
well established that the selection modified by niche construction can be 109 
evolutionarily important, and can generate rich microevolutionary dynamics. By 110 
modifying selection, niche construction can create new evolutionary outcomes, affect 111 
the stability of equilibria, generate timelagged effects (e.g., populations continue to 112 
evolve after selection has stopped), facilitate range expansion, generate self-113 
perpetuating, acceleratory niche-constructing capabilities (Kylafis & Loreau, 2008; 114 
Laland et al., 1996, 1999; Odling-Smee et al., 2003; Silver & DiPaolo, 2006), as well 115 
as many other important consequences. In other words, the feedback that niche 116 
construction generates in evolution makes a difference to how organisms evolve. 117 
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 One implication of NCT is that, because organisms are recognized to modify 118 
selection pressures in their own and in other species’ environments, and in the process 119 
to introduce feedback to both ontogenetic and evolutionary processes, niche-120 
constructing organisms cannot be viewed as merely ‘vehicles’ for their genes 121 
(Dawkins, 1976), or as passive victims of selection. Many researchers have suggested 122 
that this active, constructive conception of the role of organisms in evolution, and 123 
indeed in ontogeny, fits better with conceptualisations of human agency that are 124 
widespread within the human sciences (Bickerton, 2009; Gottlieb 1998, 2000, 2002; 125 
Kendal et al., 2011; Laland et al., 2000; Layton, 2010; O’Brien & Laland, in press; 126 
Odling-Smee et al., 2003; Oyama et al., 2001; Plotkin, 2010).   127 
 A second implication is that there is no requirement for niche construction to 128 
result directly from genetic variation in order for it to modify natural selection. 129 
Humans can and do modify their environments mainly through ontogenetic and 130 
cultural processes, and it is this reliance on learning, plasticity and culture that lends 131 
human niche construction a special potency (Kendal, in press; Kendal et al., 2011; 132 
O’Brien & Laland, in press; Smith, 2007). However, humans are far from unique in 133 
engaging in niche construction. Niche construction is a very general process, 134 
exhibited by all living organisms (Odling-Smee et al., 2003), and species do not 135 
require advanced intellect or sophisticated technology to change their world 136 
(Cuddington et al., 2010; Jones, Lawton & Shachak, 1994, 1997; Odling-Smee et al., 137 
2003). Nonetheless, largely because of its reliance on culture, human niche 138 
construction is unusually potent – so much so that our species has been characterized 139 
as ‘the ultimate niche constructors’ (Smith, 2007, p. 188). 140 
 While the niche construction perspective is growing rapidly in followers, 141 
articles and recognition, it is not yet a mainstream view within evolutionary biology, 142 
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and remains the source of some controversy (Laland, Odling-Smee & Feldman, 2004; 143 
Laland et al., 2011; Laland & Sterelny, 2006; see http://www.nicheconstruction.com/ 144 
for a discussion of some of the issues). Yet, there are reasons to anticipate that NCT 145 
might be regarded as less contentious, and of more overt immediate utility, to 146 
researchers studying human behaviour than elsewhere. That is partly because of the 147 
self-apparent potency of human niche construction. There can be no doubt that human 148 
culture, expressed in our tools, our engineering and our technology, has massively 149 
changed human environments. That fact, combined with the comparatively reduced 150 
role of genetic variation in causing human behavioural variation, means that human 151 
niche construction cannot be fully explained by prior natural selection. There are 152 
already many signs that evolutionarily-minded human scientists, including 153 
philosophers, archaeologists, anthropologists, psychologists, and primatologists are 154 
finding NCT useful (see Kendal et al., 2011 for an overview), and one message of our 155 
article is that there are likely to be similar opportunities for developmental 156 
psychologists.  157 
 158 
1.2 Multiple processes of niche construction 159 
Odling-Smee et al. (2003) describe how humans can acquire the knowledge that is 160 
expressed in niche construction through a set of information-acquiring processes 161 
operating at three different levels – population genetic, developmental and cultural 162 
(Figure 2). The three levels are distinct but interconnected with each interacting with, 163 
but not completely determined by, the others.  164 
 All organisms inherit genetic information from their ancestors, and this is the 165 
most fundamental source of information that underpins niche construction. However, 166 
some factors in the environment can potentially change many times within the typical 167 
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lifespan of the animal concerned, and natural selection has selected for processes 168 
allowing individuals to adjust on a within- lifetime basis, some of which are 169 
adaptations for acquiring knowledge. These secondary sources of information are 170 
complementary to the first; for instance, learning allows individual organisms to fine 171 
tune their behaviour.  172 
 Learning and development can be of considerable importance to evolution 173 
because learned knowledge can guide niche construction, the consequences of which 174 
can be inherited through ecological inheritance. This highlights one of the major 175 
differences that niche construction makes to the evolutionary process: acquired 176 
characteristics can play a role in evolution through their influence on the selective 177 
environment. In humans this ability is facilitated by a further set of processes, such as 178 
language, teaching, and prosociality that collectively underlie cultural processes, 179 
enhancing the efficacy of knowledge transfer (Boyd, Richerson & Henrich, 2011; 180 
Dean, Kendal, Schapiro, Thierry & Laland, 2012; Moll & Tomasello, 2009). Much of 181 
human niche construction is guided by socially learned knowledge and cultural 182 
inheritance, but the transmission and acquisition of this knowledge is itself dependent 183 
on pre-existing information acquired through genetic evolution, complex ontogenetic 184 
processes, or prior social learning (see Figure 2). 185 
 186 
1.3 Feedback at multiple levels 187 
Niche construction modifies selection not only at the genetic level, but also at the 188 
ontogenetic and cultural levels as well, to facilitate learning and mediate cultural 189 
traditions, with consequences that not only feed back to the constructor population, 190 
but modify selection for other organisms too. For instance, the construction of towns 191 
and cities created new health hazards associated with large-scale human aggregation, 192 
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such as the spread of epidemics (Diamond, 1997). Humans may either respond to this 193 
novel selection pressure, exclusively or in combination (i) through biological 194 
evolution, with the selection of resistant genotypes, (ii) at the ontogenetic level, by 195 
developing antibodies that confer some immunity, or (iii) ‘cultural evolution’, for 196 
instance by creating hospitals, medicines and vaccines (Laland et al., 2000; Laland & 197 
Brown, 2006; Odling-Smee et al., 2003). 198 
 Where a culturally transmitted response to human niche construction is not 199 
possible, perhaps because the population lacks the requisite knowledge or technology, 200 
then a genetic response may occur. An example is the coevolution of dairy farming 201 
and the allele for adult lactose absorption, where several lines of evidence now 202 
support the hypothesis that dairy farming created the selection pressures that favoured 203 
this allele in pastoralist populations (Burger, Kirchner, Bramanti, Haak & Thomas, 204 
2007; Durham 1991; Holden & Mace, 1997; Myles et al., 2005; Simoons, 1970). 205 
Cultural niche construction can also generate selection on other species, most 206 
obviously the domesticates. Beja-Pereira et al. (2003) established that the spread of 207 
dairy farming also affected geographical variation in milk protein genes in European 208 
cattle breeds, which covary with present day patterns of lactose tolerance in humans. 209 
 Humans are massive constructors of developmental environments. By 210 
modifying the world, human niche construction creates artefacts and other externally 211 
inherited resources that not only act as sources of biological selection on human genes 212 
but shape the learning opportunities and developmental trajectories of recipient 213 
organisms. Wheeler and Clark (2008, p. 3564) describe as ‘cognitive niche 214 
construction’ the fact that ‘animals build physical structures that transform problem 215 
spaces in ways that aid (or sometimes impede) thinking and reasoning about some 216 
target domain or domains’, and these physical and informational legacies ‘make 217 
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possible whole new forms of thought and reason’. We see this also in non-human 218 
animals. For instance, Fragaszy (in press) describes how capuchin monkeys create 219 
learning environments for youngsters, by transforming the environment in a manner 220 
that scaffolds their learning, and channels it towards established traditions (we discuss 221 
this further below). Social transmission maintained through inadvertent, or less 222 
commonly advertent, modification of the local environment is surprisingly common: 223 
it is known to underlie pine cone opening in black rats (Terkel, 1996), milk-bottle 224 
opening in various birds (Sherry & Galef, 1984), the learning of food sites through 225 
pheromone trails in ants (Denny, Wright & Grief, 2001), mate-choice copying in egg-226 
dumping fishes (Goldsmidt, Bakker & Feuth-de Bruijn, 1993), and food preference 227 
learning through excretory products in rats (Laland & Plotkin, 1991, 1993). This 228 
facilitation of learning through the construction of developmental environments 229 
reaches its zenith in humans (Kendal, in press; Sterelny, 2012), as we detail in 230 
subsequent sections. 231 
 232 
2. Developmental Niche Construction 233 
In 2000, psychologist, Mary Gauvain, commented in support of Laland et al.’s (2000) 234 
niche construction review, but warned that amalgamation of biological and human 235 
social sciences ‘will not be met unless the biological and evolutionary approaches are 236 
better integrated with theory and research in human psychological development’ 237 
(Gauvain, 2000, p. 153). She pointed out that it is not coincidental that there is a 238 
strong assimilation of humanity’s biological capabilities and their social and cultural 239 
context of development as this is essential for survival. Similarly, Boyd et al. (2011) 240 
argue that humanity’s ‘cultural niche’ has allowed our species to settle in all corners 241 
of the world, through the transmission of cultural information necessary for building 242 
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shelters, sourcing food and staying safe and healthy in even the most inhospitable 243 
environments. Without cultural information and the resulting niche that is developed 244 
over generations, it is unlikely that humans would survive in hostile environments. 245 
This point is illustrated well by the unfortunate fate of extensively resourced 246 
explorers, Sir John Franklin and Robert Burke, who perished in the Arctic and 247 
Australian outback, respectively, despite both locations being inhabited by natives 248 
relying on cultural niche construction to live in these harsh environments (Henrich & 249 
McElreath, 2003).  250 
In the following section, we present an illustrative set of examples of human 251 
psychological development in relation to developmental niche construction: we 252 
discuss the transmission of culturally relevant information between individuals, how 253 
the human mind is a symbol-generating and artefact-devising system, and how these 254 
processes are bi-directional, with infants and children being directed, and directing, 255 
their development. We also highlight pertinent examples in non-humans that parallel 256 
or further explicate the processes we discuss.  257 
  258 
Before a baby is born, behavioural indices of differences in heart rate and leg 259 
kicking show that during the final trimester, a foetus can discriminate different sounds, 260 
languages, forms of music, and voices (Hepper, 1989, 1991). Simultaneously, parents 261 
are typically structuring an environment for their imminent arrival that, unparalleled 262 
in any other species, facilitates the baby’s rapid cognitive development and the 263 
acquisition of cultural information. A premise for much work by developmental 264 
psychologists is that this relationship between cognitive development and the 265 
constructed environment is dynamic. Here we present four processes, natural 266 
pedagogy, activity theory, distributed cognition and situated learning, in which we 267 
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focus on how the construction of a learning environment by culturally knowledgeable 268 
others affects the acquisition of beliefs and practices by novices, and consider how 269 
cultural novices are active participants in this process. Our aim is to provide an 270 
illustration of possible interfaces between NCT and developmental psychology, in the 271 
hope of facilitating discussion between the two. 272 
 273 
2.1 Natural Pedagogy 274 
Typically, infants are born into cultural environments (‘niches’) and are 275 
surrounded by individuals performing cultural behaviour. A critical question is how 276 
cultural novices acquire this information? Gergely and Csibra (in press) argue that for 277 
a naïve learner to acquire cultural information solely through observational learning 278 
would be extremely arduous. First, cultural behaviour is often cognitively opaque, 279 
such that it is not obvious why an action is performed in a specific manner, nor which 280 
action to copy. Second, cultural information can be generic, involving a behaviour 281 
that can be generalised across a group of similar artefacts or contexts, and so an infant 282 
needs to extrapolate what she has learnt from the immediate context to related 283 
situations.  284 
In order to acquire cultural behaviour, Gergely and Csibra (in press) propose 285 
that humans have a social communicative learning mechanism, ‘natural pedagogy’, in 286 
which culturally knowledgeable individuals (usually adults) assist novices in 287 
acquiring cultural behaviour through ostensive-referential demonstrations of the 288 
relevant aspects of the behaviour. Infants’ preferences for eye contact, infant-directed 289 
speech and infant-directed contingent reactivity (that is behaviour made in response to 290 
an infant’s behaviour) show that the proposed ostensive cues are relevant to infants 291 
from a young age (Csibra, 2010). These attention-gaining cues then allow gaze-292 
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following of a knowledgeable individual’s focus to a referential target and their 293 
actions upon it (Senju & Csibra, 2008; Senju, Csibra & Johnson, 2008).  294 
According to Gergely and Csibra (in press), what makes their proposal unique 295 
is that infants encode the information they receive from an ostensive-referential 296 
communication qualitatively differently than if acquired in a non-communicative 297 
situation. Ostensive-referential communication allows infants to learn referenced 298 
features of an object more quickly than non-referenced features (Yoon, Johnson & 299 
Csibra, 2008), to encode the demonstrated functional property of an artefact-kind 300 
(Futó, Téglás, Csibra & Gergely, 2010), and to learn novel means-end actions despite 301 
their apparent cognitive opacity (Gergely, Bekkering & Kiraly, 2002). Thus, 302 
ostensive-referential information presented by culturally knowledgeable others allows 303 
cultural novices to learn and apply referenced features to their own behaviour rapidly.  304 
Natural pedagogy suggests that cultural experts construct a cultural niche, 305 
facilitating the acquisition of cultural knowledge by the novice by gaining their 306 
attention, through processes such as motionese (Brand, Baldwin & Ashburn, 2002), 307 
motherese (Newport, 1977), calling their name, and use of ostensive cues to highlight 308 
relevant aspects of the behaviour. As the term ‘natural pedagogy’ suggests, the 309 
predisposition to employ such cues is assumed to be universal amongst humans, yet 310 
the manifestation of these cues and the learning environment to which the recipient is 311 
exposed may be culturally variant. Variability in natural pedagogy across cultures is 312 
expected as cultures differ in many features including their child-rearing practices, the 313 
means deployed to allow transmission of culturally relevant behaviour, and the extent 314 
of cognitive opacity of local traditions and artefacts.   315 
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In contrast, chimpanzees and orangutans do not appear to understand the 316 
intention of another to impart useful information through pointing and/or gaze 317 
alternation between the ‘learner’ and referential target (Hare & Tomasello, 2004; 318 
Hermann, Call, Hernández-Lloreda, Hare & Tomasello, 2007; Tomasello, Call & 319 
Gluckman, 1997), whereas even pre-linguistic children do (Behne, Carpenter & 320 
Tomasello, 2005). Indeed, the human-specific propensity for developmental niche 321 
construction is likely to go far beyond the role of pedagogy. For instance, Tomasello, 322 
Carpenter, Call, Behne and Moll (2005) describe how humans engage in species-323 
unique forms of cultural cognition and evolution, enabling everything from the 324 
creation and use of linguistic symbols to the construction of social norms and 325 
individual beliefs to the establishment of social institutions. This encompasses a 326 
species-unique motivation to share emotions, experience, and activities with other 327 
persons, greatly enriching what West, King and Arberg (1988) term, the ontogenetic 328 
niche. Cultural niche construction theory can coalesce our understanding of 329 
developmental mechanisms affecting the constructed learning environments and the 330 
influence of evolutionary dynamics on such environments. The developmental 331 
outcome is children’s ability to construct dialogic cognitive representations, which 332 
enable them to participate in collective human cognition, a topic discussed below. 333 
 334 
2.2 Activity Theory   335 
Within activity theory, which derives from the work of twentieth century 336 
Soviet psychologists, particularly Vygotsky and Leont’ev, an ‘active’ learner is 337 
placed within a wide social, historical and political context (Vygotsky 1962, 1978), 338 
that is, a cultural-historical niche. This bears some resemblance to the perspective of 339 
15 
 
those primatologists influenced by ecological psychology, who view organism and 340 
environment as a combined whole or integrated system (Gibson 1979, 1986), and who 341 
suggest that an understanding of how behavioural traditions are maintained across 342 
generations requires, ‘a dynamic conception of the individual as engaged with its 343 
world, both social and asocial elements, in ongoing commerce’ (Fragaszy & 344 
Visallberghi, 2001, p.84, italics added). 345 
As we will see for distributed cognition, activity theory transcends an actor’s 346 
boundary and investigates change both within and between individuals. It considers 347 
behaviour to be goal directed, and both for development to be mediated by social and 348 
cultural history and visa-versa; thus the unit of analysis is the socially organized 349 
activity (Leont’ev, 1981). This approach is pertinent to NCT, where elements of the 350 
socially-constructed niche such as tools, norms, schooling practices are culturally or 351 
ecologically inherited, influencing the learner’s activities and, at a population level, 352 
affecting cultural selection. 353 
Similarly, in the animal kingdom the activities of others alter the learner’s 354 
relation with objects in their environment. For instance, Fragaszy (in press) describes 355 
how capuchin monkeys (Cebus spp.) create learning environments for youngsters 356 
through enduring alterations of the physical environment. The discarded palm nut 357 
shells and stone hammers (Ottoni & Izar, 2008), ripped bamboo canes resulting from 358 
extraction of beetle larvae (Gunst, Boinski & Fragaszy, 2008) or spilt traces of juice 359 
(Crast, Hardy & Fragaszy, 2010) are attractive to young monkeys and act as key 360 
artefacts which support persistent practice thus facilitating the acquisition of the 361 
extractive foraging behaviour. Likewise Leca, Gunst and Huffman (2010) report that 362 
piles of stones resulting from stone-handling activities in Japanese macaques are 363 
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attractive to others, supporting re-use and even transport of such ‘favoured’ stones by 364 
group members. In these examples, learning is thereby stimulated and channelled 365 
towards established behavioural traditions even without direct observation of the 366 
behaviour.   367 
In some cases, children may achieve the same end point, such as being able to 368 
undertake mathematical transformations through division and multiplication, but the 369 
specifics of their social environment may mean they learn and express these skills 370 
through different activities. For example, Brazilian street children are able to 371 
complete complex arithmetic calculations when presented in the familiar context of 372 
selling sweets/candy but when similar problems are presented in a more formalized 373 
manner, they fail to do so (Carraher, Carraher & Schliemann, 1985). Thus the 374 
learning and execution of a skill needs to be seen in context, as being constructed 375 
within, and supported by, a culturally-constructed niche.  376 
The relation between activity theory and niche construction is illustrated by 377 
the ‘mediational triangle’ (Cole & Engeström, 2001, Figure 3, published in relation to 378 
Distributed Cognition which we discuss next, but relevant to the point we wish to 379 
make here), which expresses the complex relation between artefacts, norms, 380 
communities, objects and subjects. For example, mediation through cultural practices 381 
and understanding alters the ‘intramental plane’, that is the participant’s relation with 382 
an object. An example of cultural (and historical) mediation of the intramental plane, 383 
used by Leont’ev (1981), is the disparity in the way traders and geologists learn to 384 
view gem-stones, with one seeing them as valuable assets, and the other viewing them 385 
in terms of their geological properties. Thus, in relation to the intramental plane, 386 
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‘collective activity shapes the object and possible responses to it’ (recounted by 387 
Edwards, 2005, p. 4).  388 
Cases of social learning in non-humans may be consistent with the activity 389 
theorists’ notion of culturally specific mediation on the so-called intramental plane. 390 
For instance, Gruber, Muller, Reynolds, Wrangham and Zuberbühler (2011) show 391 
that two populations of chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes Schweinfurthii), react differently 392 
to the affordances of a multi- functional leafy-twig tool, such that chimpanzees from 393 
Sonso (who have a leaf technology) found the leaves most salient while chimpanzees 394 
from Kanywara (who have a probing technology) focussed on the stick part.  395 
Vygotsky’s work is particularly useful as he developed measurable concepts 396 
to capture the effect of mediation on learning; specifically, the Zone of Proximal 397 
Development (ZPD), defined as ‘the distance between the actual developmental level 398 
as determined by independent problem solving and the level of potential development 399 
as determined through problem solving under adult guidance or in collaboration with 400 
more capable peers’ (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 86, emphasis in the original). The intention 401 
was that this concept could be applied to learning across a variety of contexts, and 402 
relate to qualitative changes in the learner’s cognitive development (Chaiklin, 2003).  403 
In line with the concept of the ZPD, adults frequently attempt to structure a 404 
child’s learning environment, providing a learning niche for them, as described by 405 
Wood (1998, p. 97): 406 
When we help a child solve a problem, we are providing conditions in 
which he can begin to perceive regularities and structure in his 
experience. Where, left alone, the child is overcome by uncertainty and 
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does not know what to attend to or what to do, instruction can help in a 
number of ways. When we point things out to the child, we help to 
highlight what he should attend to. By reminding children we are helping 
them to bring to mind and exploit those aspects of their past experience 
that we (as experts) but not they (as novices) know to be relevant to what 
they are currently trying to do. 
Through his work using The Tower of Nottingham, (ToN; see Figure 4) Wood and 407 
colleagues have investigated tutoring and learning situations (Wood, Bruner & Ross, 408 
1976; Wood, Wood & Middleton, 1978). Children younger than seven years could not 409 
build the ToN without help, but, after instruction from an adult, children as young as 410 
three years were able to complete the ToN alone. Adults scaffolded the children’s 411 
learning experience by highlighting the mechanics of specific aspects of the task, 412 
selecting pertinent pieces, orienting objects so its pertinent parts were easily viewed 413 
and removing elements not critical to learning at that time. Yet, some forms of 414 
tutoring, such as demonstrating full assembly of the ToN or providing complex verbal 415 
instructions, were not successful as they overloaded the learner. Accordingly, Wood 416 
and colleagues coined the concept of ‘contingent tutoring’ as the most effective form 417 
of instruction, relying on two rules: when a learner is in difficulty provide more 418 
assistance, and when a learner is succeeding provide less.  419 
 Although advertent social learning, or teaching, is extremely rare in non-420 
humans and its distribution likely linked to cooperative breeding rather than 421 
taxonomic affinity to humans (see Hoppitt, Brown, Kendal, Rendell, Thornton, 422 
Webster and Laland, 2008) one case merits discussion regarding ‘contingent 423 
tutoring’. Thornton and McAuliffe (2006) elegantly demonstrated that in meerkats 424 
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(Suricata suricatta) non-productive ‘helpers’ teach young pups how to handle 425 
aggressive and toxic scorpions which form part of their diet. The behaviour of the 426 
tutor helpers appears to be contingent in that, upon provisioning a scorpion, they 427 
monitor the pup and nudge the scorpion with their paws or nose if the pup fails to 428 
attempt to handle it; a behaviour which seemingly attracts the pups attention and 429 
enhances consumption success. Likewise the provision of increasingly intact (and 430 
thus difficult/dangerous to handle) scorpions to pups as they increase in age would 431 
also appear contingent. However, it was found (Thornton & McAuliffe, 2006) that 432 
here the behaviour of the tutor was contingent upon the vocal cue of age-related 433 
changes in pup begging calls rather than the pups’ changing competence. This 434 
situation perhaps being reminiscent of formal education being largely age, rather than 435 
performance, based in humans. 436 
Two important points that are particularly evident in human populations are 437 
that children are not passive recipients of an adult’s instruction and that instructors are 438 
not always adults. In relation to the former, in naturalistic settings it is often the child, 439 
not the adult, who initiates interactions and sets the goal (Carew, 1980; Wells, 1981). 440 
Thus, to a degree, and consistent with NCT, children direct their own learning by 441 
shaping their own learning environment. Also in natural settings, children often learn 442 
from other children (see Dean et al., 2012; Flynn & Whiten, 2010; Whiten & Flynn, 443 
2010). For instance, Wood and colleagues extended their investigation to children’s 444 
peer tutoring, finding that the rate of contingent tutoring increases with age from 3 to 445 
7 years (Wood et al., 1995) and it appears that different forms of social learning (e.g. 446 
observational learning or reasoning regarding the intentions of tutors) may be 447 
pertinent at different ages (Ellis & Gauvain 1992; Flynn, 2008; Selman 1980; Whiten 448 
& Flynn, 2010). A child’s cognitive development will, in part, influence the type of 449 
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interaction most pertinent to their learning; cognitive development informs the 450 
learning niche that a child experiences.  451 
Recent research has investigated the bi-directional relation between cognitive 452 
development and social learning. Theory and evidence suggest that more 453 
sophisticated mental state understanding leads to more effective peer tutoring (Flynn, 454 
2010; Strauss, Ziv & Stein, 2002; Tomasello, Kruger & Ratner, 1993). Yet the reverse 455 
is also true; more sophisticated interactions lead to more complex mental state 456 
understanding, as well as more refined skills in other areas, such as executive 457 
functioning. For example, contact with adults or older siblings appears to have a 458 
positive effect on theory of mind development (Lewis, Freeman, Kyriadidou, 459 
Maridaki-Kassotaki & Berridge, 1996; Ruffman, Perner, Naito, Parkin, & Clements, 460 
1998). Similarly, wider cultural norms of a society can affect cognitive development. 461 
For instance, Japanese children have been shown to pass theory of mind tasks later 462 
than their Western counterparts (Naito, 2003), a trend that may be due to a cultural 463 
focus on social rules, and less on mental states, in Japanese society (Naito & Koyama, 464 
2006). In contrast, Asian children perform better than North American or British 465 
children on tests of executive functioning (Chen et al., 1998; Sabbagh, Xu, Carlson, 466 
Moses & Lee, 2006), perhaps due to differing cultural emphases on control of 467 
behaviour in social settings.  468 
 469 
2.3 Distributed Cognition 470 
While cognition is generally seen as a process that occurs within an individual, 471 
albeit with theoretical positions suggesting that environmental factors may facilitate 472 
this context, distributed cognition (DC) emphasises the dispersed nature of cognitive 473 
phenomena across individuals, artefacts and internal and external representations. In 474 
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this respect it resembles the cognitive niche construction of Wheeler and Clark (2008). 475 
Cultural processes transcend the boundaries of the individual and so need to be 476 
understood in context with the single or multiple actor’s/s’ interactions with the 477 
artefacts being used within the given activity. Distributed cognition is critical in 478 
developmental niche construction as it allows children to work with others to learn, 479 
undertake and develop cultural practices, relying on coordination across a group. 480 
Developmental systems theory strongly contradicts a purely ‘genocentric 481 
account of heredity’ (Griffiths & Gray, 2001) as many resources persist across 482 
successive generations and are part of the explanation for heredity. Likewise, NCT 483 
includes the notion that an inherited ‘niche’ constitutes an organism-environment 484 
relationship, which can consist of the inheritance of resource and semantic 485 
information both internal and external to the organism (Odling-Smee et al., 2003). 486 
These perspectives allows us to understand how people learn to design and use 487 
artefacts that have evolved through the process of cumulative culture and also how 488 
individuals learn to participate in cultural activities that require collaboration and 489 
cooperation (e.g. flying an aeroplane, Hutchins & Klausen, 1996).  490 
One cognitive function that facilitates distributed cognition, and has been a 491 
recent focus of research in developmental and comparative psychology, is ‘we-492 
intentionality’ (Plotkin, 2003) or shared intentionality (Tomasello & Carpenter, 2007). 493 
In this regard, Moll and Tomasello (2007, p. 1) coined the Vygotskian Intelligence 494 
Hypothesis, noting ‘that the unique aspects of human cognition - the cognitive skills 495 
needed to create complex technologies, cultural institutions and systems of symbols, 496 
for example - were driven by, or even constituted by, social cooperation.’ Thus social 497 
cooperation most likely provides a key component of the mediation process and the 498 
construction of a distributed niche. In contrast, non-human primates would appear to 499 
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lack the same degree of pro-sociality (Dean et al., 2012) and typically fail in tasks that 500 
require coordinated collaboration, whether the goal is ‘social’ (Warneken, Chen & 501 
Tomasello, 2006) or a food-based reward (Jensen, Hare, Call & Tomasello, 2006; Silk 502 
et al., 2005).  503 
Symbolic representation systems often form critical components of culturally 504 
constructed learning environments. For instance, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis 505 
concerns the degree to which cognitive development is constrained by language 506 
(Whorf, 1956). Miller, Smith, Zhu and Zhang (1995) and Miller and Stigler (1987) 507 
investigated the acquisition of learning of mathematical notation for Chinese and 508 
American children. No difference was found for the acquisition of the numbers from 509 
0 to 10; however, from 11 to 20 American children performed relatively poorly. It is 510 
thought that this is due to the relative irregularity of the number system (from 11 to 511 
20) for English speakers. However, the language of a culture is entwined with other 512 
cultural practices, thus it would be premature to conclude that differences in thought 513 
are due entirely to the form of symbolic representation used. Furthermore, the 514 
distinction of ontogenetic and culturally specific cognitive, emotional, and identity-515 
related characteristics can, themselves, be reflected and retained in linguistic cognates 516 
(Malik, 2000). In this context, NCT provides a framework to examine explicit 517 
relationships between the cultural evolution of symbolic representation systems and 518 
cognitive development. Crucially, NCT draws attention to the effect of the ecological 519 
inheritance of both information and resources on development. 520 
The field of distributed cognition considers cognition in terms of the change in 521 
relational structures, including components that are internal and external to the mind. 522 
Hence, the focus is on the interaction of people and artefacts, rather than just 523 
assessing individual cognition ‘within the head’ (Nardi, 1996). Hutchins (1995) 524 
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criticizes the cognitive sciences for not incorporating the cultural process, which 525 
generates artefacts, in their understanding of the individual. He asserts that this can 526 
lead to the over-attribution of intelligence (or aspects of cognitive facility) to the mind 527 
in order to explain observed behaviour, which instead, should be considered 528 
properties of sociocultural systems that include both biotic and abiotic phenomena. 529 
For instance, Hutchins argues that computation that results from a mathematician 530 
manipulating symbols on a chalk board is not occurring inside the head of the 531 
mathematician, but rather as a consequence of interaction with the external symbols. 532 
Computational tools that automate these sequences of symbolic manipulation are 533 
models of a sociocultural system rather than cognition internal to the mathematician. 534 
On this basis, Hutchins (1995) criticizes cognitive scientists and artificial intelligence 535 
research that have attempted to use the computer as a model for the human mind. 536 
NCT can be used to examine the developmental and evolutionary feedback between 537 
internal mental facility and external resources that make up the sociocultural system. 538 
Taking the position that the development of cognition is affected by learned 539 
rules or axioms in conjunction with artefactual symbolic representation in material 540 
culture is equivalent to developmental systems theorists’ advocation of a parity thesis 541 
in biology, that ‘the roles played by the many causal factors that affect development 542 
do not fall neatly into two kinds, one exclusively played by DNA elements the other 543 
exclusively played by non-DNA elements. . . . Instead, there are numerous important 544 
distinctions to be drawn amongst the causal roles played by developmental factors’ 545 
(Griffiths & Gray, 2005, p. 420). 546 
 547 
2.4 Situated Learning 548 
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The niche into which we are born will, in part, dictate what we learn. The 549 
authors of this article do not know how to build an igloo, or cook the perfect 550 
spanakopita, but all of us have learnt the art of playing rounders (a common primary 551 
school game in the UK). Developmental niche construction may not only dictate what 552 
we learn through careful signalling, scaffolding or the presentation of culturally 553 
relevant tools, but also through the presentation of opportunities to learn activities 554 
through participation. In its simplest form, regarding the physical environment, even 555 
animals who provide no parental care (Stamps, 2003), select a natal habitat for their 556 
eggs which provides a broad range of environmental conditions which influence 557 
development from laying to hatching and, where individuals remain in their natal 558 
habitat for extended periods, throughout juvenile development (West & King, 1987). 559 
Such spatial ‘ecological inheritance’ has evolutionary consequences due to the 560 
feedback it generates; through ‘preference induction’ (Stamps, 2003) individuals who 561 
experienced a certain niche during development are themselves likely to select it as a 562 
natal habitat for their offspring – a form of extragenetic inheritance.   563 
The social aspect of situated learning has been highlighted by Sterelny (2012) 564 
who illustrated the point with another example from the animal kingdom. Some 565 
dolphins in Shark Bay, Western Australia, forage with sponges over their snouts 566 
likely as protection but also to increase foraging efficiency (Mann & Sargeant, 2003).  567 
Although group differences in sponge use have been reported, Sterelny (2012) points 568 
out that dolphins who use sponges spend longer in deep channels than those 569 
exploiting shallow waters off beaches. As calves accompany their mothers while 570 
foraging, the calves of sponge-users experience different environments to calves of 571 
beach-exploiters. Thus, being exposed for longer to the deep channels (irrespective of 572 
witnessing any use of sponges) may support trial and error learning of sponge use, 573 
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through encountering sponges and spending longer in environs where sponge use is a 574 
beneficial foraging technique.  575 
There are other prominent examples in non-humans, where the inherited social 576 
niche influences individual’s social skill development. Sapolsky and Share (2004) 577 
reported the establishment of an atypical ‘pacific culture’ in a wild group of olive 578 
baboons (Papio anubis) which experienced a complete loss of the most aggressive 579 
group males. The peaceable culture of the group was maintained for at least a decade, 580 
representing complete turnover of the original males who died/emigrated. This is 581 
thought to be due to the participation in group life of immigrant males (often 582 
adolescent) resulting in adoption of the group tradition of a relatively ‘relaxed’ 583 
dominance hierarchy. More commonly, within old world primates the inheritance of 584 
rank, through being born into a matriline (or lineage) of a specific relative rank, 585 
influences the rates and types of agonistic interactions individuals experience, which 586 
in turn through ‘ontogenetic ritualization’ (Tomasello & Call, 1997) influences 587 
development of their social skills.  Finally, Flack et al. (2006) showed how, in captive 588 
pigtailed macaques (Macaca nemestrina), impartial intervention in conflicts 589 
(‘policing’) by a few dominant individuals, served to stabilise social groups allowing 590 
individuals to develop within, and construct their own, social niches in ways that 591 
enhance the advantages of group-living. For example, individuals were involved in 592 
social networks that were large, and diverse in terms of partners; circumstances 593 
thought to facilitate the emergence of cooperation and behavioural traditions (Flack et 594 
al. 2006; Hill et al. 2011).   595 
Despite these examples, situated learning is normally a term reserved for 596 
human learning. Karmiloff-Smith (2009) highlights how parents alter the environment 597 
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for children who have a developmental disorder compared to their typically 598 
developing siblings. She states (2009, p. 60) that:  599 
 
Informal observations of families who visit our lab reveal that 
parents of infants and toddlers with genetic syndromes find it 
difficult (compared to parents of typically developing children) 
to allow their atypically developing offspring to mouth objects 
freely and to crawl/walk uninhibited in order to fully explore 
their environment. This reticence is probably because of greater 
fear of potential danger and accidents, but it results in a less 
richly explored environment. 
 600 
She illustrates her point further with the example of parents of children with 601 
developmental disorders who, by quickly correcting mistakes, inhibit the common 602 
overgeneralization in language acquisition seen in typical development. Such 603 
inhibition of this overgeneralisation may create the delayed category formation seen 604 
in some developmental disorders along with presenting less variation in linguistic 605 
input, shorter sentences, and in general a less richly varied environment. Thus, 606 
learning opportunities about culturally relevant behaviour may not only arise through 607 
natural pedagogy, contingent tutoring or distributed cognition and the use of tools, but 608 
simply by having certain learning opportunities, and not others, available. 609 
Lave and Wenger (1991) describe the process of becoming mature members 610 
of a ‘community of practice’, or social formation of individuals engaged in a 611 
particular kind of activity, as ‘legitimate peripheral participation’. Newcomers begin 612 
in a position that is not central to the learned practice within a community, and yet 613 
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their participation is legitimate, meaning that the newcomers take on established or 614 
recognised activity within the community during the learning process. For instance, 615 
tailor apprentices typically start their legitimate peripheral participation with initial 616 
preparation work and finishing details on completed garments. Then, the apprentice 617 
slowly moves backwards through the production process as skills develop, before 618 
being given crucial cloth cutting jobs.  619 
Lave and Wenger assert that learning through legitimate peripheral 620 
participation occurs in situ, through participation in the community activity, 621 
emphasising the acquisition of cultural knowledge through participation and 622 
involvement rather than ostensive teaching and instruction (see Rogoff et al., 2007 623 
and Rogoff, Paradise, Mejía Arauz, Correa-Chávez and Angelillo, 2003, for a similar 624 
process which they label ‘learning through intent community participation’). Thus the 625 
process is not concerned with a knowledgeable individual transmitting information to 626 
a less knowledgeable individual (as discussed above), rather, seeing both individuals 627 
as parts of a larger community, with artefacts, symbols and social norms which 628 
support the novice’s development in a community of practice. For example, López, 629 
Correa-Chávez, Rogoff and Gutiérrez (2010) found that Mexican children with 630 
experience of indigenous practices paid more sustained attention than their American 631 
Mexican-heritage counterparts to the instructions being given to another child about 632 
how to make a toy. Learning environments can be structured through a dynamic 633 
apprenticeship process, and this processes may vary culturally, with some cultures 634 
being more attuned to paying attention to ongoing events (Indigenous / Indigenous-635 
heritage communities of the Americas), while others (Europeans) tend to focus on one 636 
event at a time, seemingly unaware of other co-occurring events (Chavajay & Rogoff, 637 
1999; Correa-Chávez, Rogoff & Mejía Arauz, 2005; Rogoff, Mistry, Goncu & 638 
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Mosier, 1993). Taking a cultural niche construction perspective in the context of 639 
situated learning, the behaviour of the community of practice provides the constructed 640 
learning environment, which affects, during legitimate peripheral participation, the 641 
cultural selection of normative expectations, habits and values adopted by the learner. 642 
While situated learning is principally concerned with the developmental 643 
learning process, Lave and Wenger (1991) situate their descriptive model within what 644 
is the equivalent of an evolutionary context. The idea of ecological inheritance of an 645 
environment modified by niche construction is inferred by their observation that, 646 
‘reproduction cycles . . . leave a historical trace of artefacts – physical, linguistic, and 647 
symbolic – and of social structures, which constitute and reconstitute the practice over 648 
time’, resulting in the ‘continuity of roles while displacement of individuals’ (1991, p. 649 
59). However, they also recognize potential for the evolution of novel behaviour and 650 
change in the community of practice over time, referring to this as, ‘developmental 651 
cycles of communities of practice’ (p. 121). They note that this can result from a 652 
conflict of interest between master and apprentice, and a change in resources such as 653 
the technology used in a particular trade (e.g., dairy farming technology in French 654 
Alpine villages; Layton, 2000). 655 
The situated learning perspective of the evolution of a community of practice 656 
would appear consistent with that of niche-construction theory and developmental 657 
systems theory. The latter argues that ‘evolution is change in the nature of populations 658 
of developmental systems. This change is driven both endogenously, through the 659 
modification by each generation of developmental systems of the resources inherited 660 
by future generations, and exogenously, through modifications of these resources by 661 
factors outside the developmental system’ (Griffiths & Gray, 2001, p. 207).  662 
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 663 
3 Future Directions 664 
We offer three areas for future directions, two of these involve the use of new 665 
techniques (neuroscience and modelling) and the other exploring the niche across the 666 
lifespan. 667 
3.1 Neuroscience, Culture and Niche Construction 668 
The brain’s plasticity means that it can be shaped by environmental input, and 669 
this plasticity is not simply available to the young (see Hertzog, Wilson, Kramer & 670 
Lindenberger, 2009; Li, 2003; Lövdén, Bäckman, Lindenberger, Schaefer & 671 
Schmiedek, 2010 for reviews). Recent technological developments, such as brain 672 
imaging, have allowed empirical investigation of the interplay between brain, 673 
behaviour and socio-cultural contexts (Miller & Kinsbourne, 2012). The work of Shu-674 
Chen Li (2003, 2008, in press) has been central in understanding the biocultural co-675 
construction of brain plasticity across the life-span. She presents development within 676 
three scales, human phylogeny, ontogeny and microgenetic times, and views these 677 
from social-cultural, behavioural, cognitive, neural and genetic perspectives.  678 
Brain differences due to experience have been seen in the visual cortex in 679 
congenitally blind individuals who are skilled Braille readers (Pascual-Leone, Amedi, 680 
Fregni & Merabet, 2005), in the primary motor cortex and auditory cortical 681 
representations of expert musicians (Elbert, Pantev, Wienbruch, Rockstroh & Taub, 682 
1995; Pantev et al., 1998), and in, the now famous study by Maguire et al. (2000) of 683 
an increase in the posterior hippocampi in individuals who have professions requiring 684 
navigating complex spatial environments. Although plasticity appears across the life 685 
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course, there are periods of sensitivity, and the extent of plasticity in old age is 686 
reduced in comparison to young adults (Erickson et al., 2007). Cross-cultural studies 687 
have also supported a ‘use-it-or-lose it’ approach to cognitive aging (Park & 688 
Gutchess, 2006, p. 107). Gutchess, Welsh, Boduroglu and Park (2006) compared 689 
Chinese and American young adults on an object processing task, finding that 690 
American participants showed more engagement in the ventral visua l cortex. 691 
Furthermore, by comparing elderly Singaporeans with American counterparts, it was 692 
found that this deficit increased more so for the Singaporeans (Chee et al., 2006). 693 
Gutchess et al. (2006) suggest that the difference seen in object processing of the two 694 
populations, Asian and America young adults, may be due to cultural differences such 695 
as the number of objects in the environment, arguing that as Eastern environments 696 
contain more objects than American environments the distinction between object and 697 
background may be less clear for the Chinese participants. Equally, differences may 698 
be due to cultural variability in the level of attendance made to different levels of 699 
information in one’s environment, as highlighted my López et al. (2010) above, in 700 
this case with Chinese participants attending more broadly to their environment. 701 
As Li (in press, p. x) points out, ‘findings regarding socio-cultural influences 702 
on life-long neurocognitive development are still very limited and leave many gaps 703 
between the different domains of analyses’; we completely agree. Thus there is much 704 
potential to explore the inter-relations between the cultural niche and neurological 705 
underpinnings of behaviour across the lifespan within many domains. Such 706 
exploration is extremely fruitful in the light of an ageing population, many of whom 707 
will suffer from cognitive decline, which may be alleviated with an appropriately 708 
constructed niche.  709 
 3.2 Modelling 710 
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Mathematical modelling and simulation can be used to explore the interaction 711 
between developmental and cultural-evolutionary dynamics. As we have emphasised, 712 
the developmental dynamics may often be heavily influenced by the socio-cultural 713 
environment. Niche construction models have already been developed to consider the 714 
affects of ecological inheritance and change in constructed resources on selection 715 
(Laland et al., 1996, 1999, 2000; Lehmann, 2008). In the current context, similar 716 
models can be used to account for the cultural inheritance of material culture and 717 
systems of symbolic representation on development (Fragaszy, in press; Hazelhurst & 718 
Hutchins, 1991; Kendal, in press). Of course, development affects individuals’ 719 
behaviour and thus their contribution to the socio-cultural environment. Thus 720 
modelling is required to clarify how particular forms of ecological inheritance interact 721 
with mechanisms of cognitive development.  722 
We have emphasised the role of a knowledgeable-other’s behaviour, and not 723 
just the influence of material culture, in constructing a learning environment affecting 724 
development. We can also expect interesting interactions between developmental and 725 
cultural-evolutionary dynamics in these cases too, where for instance, scaffolding 726 
traditions of a master affect the learning end-state of an apprentice (van Geert, 1991; 727 
van Geert & Steenbeek, 2005), or where there is continuous interaction between the 728 
dynamic learner’s cognitive state and the socio-cultural learning environment to 729 
which they contribute. Where appropriate, these models can account for the effects of 730 
differential survival and reproduction and of gene-culture coevolutionary dynamics. 731 
  732 
3.3 Culture, Peer Interaction and Niche Construction Across the Life Span 733 
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Differing social norms influence how an individual progresses within a niche. 734 
For example, in Western societies shyness is viewed as problematic, while in Chinese 735 
culture, shyness denotes a level of maturity and understanding (Chen, 2010). These 736 
norms manifest themselves in peer interactions, and result in differing temperamental 737 
dispositions being reflected in the social niche in which one finds oneself. Chen, 738 
DeSouza, Chen and Wang (2006) observed 4-year-olds in a free play setting in both 739 
Canada and China. In Canada when a shy peer initiated an interaction children 740 
ignored these advances or overtly refused them; however, in China children were 741 
more positive to advances from shy children. Similarly, shyness was associated with 742 
peer rejection in Canada, and peer acceptance in China (Chen, Rubin & Li, 1995). 743 
Thus, the value placed by society on behavioural tendencies is transmitted early to 744 
young children. As a result children’s experiences in their social circle are very 745 
different, such that shy children in China grow in self-confidence (Chen, Chen, Li & 746 
Wang, 2009), while shy children in North America who cannot regulate their 747 
behaviour to improve their peer status experience frustration and distress. Thus, 748 
variation in formative attitudes to shyness can provide a constructed environment that 749 
influences emotional development.  750 
Interestingly, and in line with the activity theory position in which 751 
development and learning must be placed within a societal, political and historical 752 
context, Chen (2012) points out that as China has shifted in recent years to a more 753 
competitive economy adapting more individualistic values (thus its cultural niche has 754 
changed), children’s shyness has increasingly been associated with peer rejection. 755 
Equally, in Western societies, where autonomy is valued, as children reach early 756 
adolescence their desire for independence from the family increases (Rubin, 757 
Bukowski & Parker, 2006), with peer, as opposed to family, support becoming a 758 
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significant aspect through which they gain self-worth (Sullivan, 1953). Thus the 759 
interplay between the socio-political environment, that contributes to the cultural 760 
niche, and dispositional factors, such as temperament, need to be investigated across 761 
the life span, as early factors will influence the differing cultural niches an individual 762 
progresses through during their life. Conversely, the activity and interaction of 763 
individuals contributes to the socio-political environment. NCT provides a framework 764 
to consider the dynamic interaction of psychological development and socio-cultural 765 
environment within and across generations. 766 
  767 
4. Conclusions 768 
Our aim in this paper has been to meet the challenge set by Gauvain (2000) to better 769 
integrate the biological and social sciences in terms of theory and research in human 770 
psychological development in the light of humans as the ultimate niche constructors. 771 
We agree with Li (2003, 2007, in press) that more work needs to consider the 772 
biocultural co-constructive influences on life-span cognitive and behavioural 773 
development. It has not been possible to include discussion of all the time scales and 774 
levels of analysis highlighted by Li (2003) but we have nonetheless reviewed some of 775 
the parallel lines of thinking across developmental psychology and NCT, and it is 776 
immediately apparent that these are extensive.  777 
 This reflection has considered niche construction in dyadic settings, in which 778 
culturally-knowledgeable others transmit information to culturally-naïve individuals 779 
(natural pedagogy and activity theory), thus teaching them how to survive and thrive 780 
within the niche. It has also considered group behaviour within a niche, reviewing 781 
work on distributed cognition and situated learning, demonstrating that human infants 782 
become part of a community (a niche) and can draw from many different sources 783 
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(peers, adults, constructed opportunities within the environment, cultural tools such as 784 
books or artefacts) to become an active member of that community. Children (like 785 
adults) are not passive recipients of biological and cultural inheritance but active 786 
agents, influencing what is learnt through changes in their cognitive development, and 787 
their active pursuit of knowledge.  788 
Of course, identifying like-minded researchers, or sympathetic bodies of 789 
theory, in other fields is one thing, and fertile exchange is another. In what ways 790 
could NCT be useful to developmental psychologists? Three points come to mind. 791 
NCT has heuristic value in drawing attention to the active agency of humans as a 792 
source of environmental and social change, as well as to the evolutionary, ecological, 793 
and social ramifications of human niche construction. By foregrounding niche 794 
construction, NCT both reduces the likelihood that it will be neglected (Laland & 795 
Sterelny, 2006) and provides theoretical justification to those who find their emphasis 796 
on that agency is under-appreciated. Second, NCT offers conceptual tools for 797 
understanding phenomena within the Human Sciences, including a variety of 798 
experimental and theoretical methods for establishing where niche construction is 799 
consequential and quantifying its impact (Odling-Smee et al., 2003). These tools also 800 
encompass an overarching conceptual framework that embraces evolutionary theory 801 
and sets human development in a comparative perspective, but at the same time is 802 
explicit in emphasizing the active agency of humans in constructing their world, and 803 
thereby shaping their development. Third, NCT offers theoretically and empirically 804 
derived insights into the dynamics of evolving systems under the influence of niche 805 
construction. Potentially scientists working in the human realm can draw from these 806 
established findings to understand better the complex dynamics of their own study 807 
systems. More generally, we suspect that there are likely to be many contemporary 808 
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developmental psychologists who are unfamiliar with NCT but who nonetheless can 809 
be regarded as ‘kindred spirits’, and who we hope will find it useful to engage with 810 
and employ NCT in new inter-disciplinary endeavours (Kendal et al., 2011; Laland et 811 
al., 2011; O’Brien & Laland, in press).  812 
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Figure legends 1218 
 1219 
Figure 1. (a) A conventional view of the process of adaptation through natural 1220 
selection. Causation is primarily linear: it starts with selection pressures stemming 1221 
from the environment and ends with changes in the organism. Reciprocal causation is 1222 
recognized only in some ‘special cases’ where the source of selection is biotic (e.g. 1223 
sexual selection, predator-prey coevolution). (b) The niche construction perspective. 1224 
Niche construction is explicitly recognized as an evolutionary process. The match 1225 
between organism and environment results from interactions of natural selection 1226 
pressures in environments and the niche-constructing activities of organisms. 1227 
Inheritance is expanded to comprise both genetic and ecological components (i.e. 1228 
legacies of selection pressures previously modified by niche construction). Causation 1229 
is primarily reciprocal, with selective environments shaping organisms, and 1230 
organisms shaping selective environments, either relative to themselves, or other 1231 
organisms.  1232 
 1233 
Figure 2. There is selective feedback at multiple levels from multiple niche-1234 
constructing processes. 1235 
 1236 
Figure 3. The relation between activity theory and niche construction is illustrated by 1237 
the ‘mediational triangle’ (Cole & Engström, 2001), which expresses the complex 1238 
relation between artefacts, norms, communities, objects and subjects. 1239 
 1240 
Figure 4 The Tower of Nottingham, a wooden block construction task made from 21 1241 
pieces and requiring a minimum of 20 moves to complete.  1242 
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